Religious realism holds that a transcendent divine reality exists; non-realism sees religion as a social construct for guidance and community. Wittgenstein’s focus on language use supports non-realism, though he never fully commits.

Introduction

In this article, I will dwell on the notions of realism and non-realism. Religious realism is a belief that a Transcendent Being or Divine entity exists independently of time and space. The tenets of religious faith are truths from the True God that transcend our beliefs and practices. In contrast, non-realism is a belief that religion is a socially constructed concept that is dependent on some context extrinsic thereto. It is a functional tool to create moral guidance and discipline (e.g., set a constitution), bring human happiness, and foster a sense of community rather than something supernatural and a-historical. Non-realists believe that, while religion is something practical for communities to have, it does not have an independent reality extrinsic to social-cultural circumstances.                                 

As my first point, I will present an outline of Wittgenstein’s philosophy and discuss whether he leans towards realism or non-realism. During my research, I have found that, while he was one of the first religious non-realists and set a solid ground for non-realism arguments and their justification in religious philosophy, he also favored some aspects of realism as well. To gauge his standing, I will explore his famous non-realist arguments and justifications behind his reasoning and inquire about responses to his opinions.            

The essence of my argument is that non-realists cannot be religious. This is not plausible because religious belief and practice are associated with the transcendent. I do not think a person can interpret religious language and concepts merely for their practical function, symbolic meaning, moral teachings, or the experiences they evoke. I believe religious texts and teachings carry factual truths about the universe.

Is Wittgenstein Non-Realist?

In the Philosophical Investigations, Ludwig Wittgenstein famously stated: "For a large class of cases – though not for all – in which we employ the word “meaning,” it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language.” [1] Wittgenstein’s philosophy was that words' meaning is not derived from a specific link to an object in the world but from their merely linguistic usage. In his work, he discussed the importance thereof and also touched upon the role of logical syntax. In his book Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, he pointed out that a sign acquires meaning through its significant use within a system of other signs. Moreover, the meaning of a sign should never influence its logical syntax. The meaning must be established through the sign’s use without directly referencing the sign itself. [2] Based on his words, we can understand that words get their meaning from their linguistic use. While he does not explicitly discuss non-realism in his work, he does lay the pertinent groundwork by focusing on the structure and limits of language and how it profiles our understanding of reality.

Wittgenstein's justification of language structure mirrors our idea of reality. Language can only picture facts in the world. He posits that the propositions in language are logical pictures of the facts. We can only speak about reality within the confines of a logical picture structure. No external reality determines the truth. He therefore argues that we cannot talk about the world from an external standpoint. We live in the world, so we can only speak from within. This is the notion of non-realism, where “absolute reality” is independent of our description. Our thoughts are limited to logical thought, making us unable to think about anything illogical. He presents a view that everything is a set of facts, and these facts are structures, not objects. At the end of his book, he concludes that we must remain silent whether there is any limit to the aspects of reality that lie beyond the scope of language, which also means beyond human cognition.        

In the article “The Earlier Wittgenstein on the Notion of Religious Attitude,” Chon Tejedor argues the notion that Wittgenstein was a religious non-realist. The chapter asserts that Wittgenstein did not subscribe to non-realism in matters religious or otherwise, indicating a complex view of reality that cannot be neatly classified as non-realist. He portrays Wittgenstein by quoting idealist Don Cupitt, the most notable advocate of religious non-realism.

He is not a behaviorist or a materialist for whom an objective physical reality comes first, nor is he an empiricist or idealist for whom private sensations or material processes come first. For him, language comes first. In our materialist-object language, we postulate and constitute a public physical world. In our language about sensations, mental processes, and the like, we postulate and constitute an inner world of the mind. Still, in the last resort, there is nothing but the facts about our linguistic practices and how they are interwoven with the forms of life they have been developed to serve.

Wittgenstein, as a philosopher,

seems determined to push us into accepting that it is futile to go beyond the human realm and the limits of language. Philosophy, in his view, is a sustained attempt to cure ourselves of transcendent illusions and persuade us to be content with what is—and what is, is language and the human realm and nothing else. Wittgenstein’s mature outlook is linguistic naturalism (there are, in the end, only facts about language), voluntarist (we, through language, constitute our world), and radical humanism (there is no sense in supposing that we humans might be able to transcend the limits of our humanity while yet somehow retaining it). Wittgenstein extends these doctrines to cover logic, mathematics, and natural science. Everywhere, he is a thoroughgoing constructivist and voluntarist: logical necessity is created by the rules of the governing language. If he is a non-realist about religion, he is also a non-realist about everything else....[he] wished his new position to be understood against the various forms of realism for which it is the cure. [3]

In “Wittgenstein and Anti-Realism” by James D. Collins, Wittgenstein's philosophy of language is explored as an early example of anti-realist theory. It rejects realist theories of meaning based on the idea that “meaning is [linguistic] use.” The document details Wittgenstein's arguments against the principle of bivalence and the realist assumption that an independent reality determines the truth or falsehood of sentences. It suggests that Wittgenstein’s rejection of realist theories of meaning and his emphasis on language use and public nature support an anti-realist interpretation.

Wittgenstein rejects all such accounts of meaning. Broadly speaking, his reason for rejecting these realist theories is that they do not consider the use of language. Wittgenstein sees the actual use of terms and sentences as at least a necessary component of their meaning. … What Wittgenstein's arguments do then is deny the principle of bivalence, for it entails the truth of the Law of Excluded Middle (LEM) in every case, but for some sentences, the Law of Excluded Middle is not true (which is not to say that it is false). If the Law of Excluded Middle is not true, then the principle of bivalence is not true either. The key to his argument is that meanings must be public; i.e., one must be able to manifest knowledge of meaning if one has such knowledge at all. [4]

“Religious Fictionalism Defended: Reply to Cordry” by Andrew Eshleman discusses the possibility of an atheist adopting a fictionalist stance towards religion. The article highlights the importance of the expressivist and instrumentalist components of religious non-realism, suggesting that fictionalism can build on already existing functions of theistic language. The text argues for continuity in the use of theistic language, emphasizing that fictionalist reinterpretation involves subtracting the truth-asserting function while amplifying expressivist and instrumentalist functions.

The fictionalist view that I outlined in my earlier paper – ‘Can an atheist believe in God?’ - combines aspects of instrumentalist and expressivist forms of religious non-realism. In brief, I argued that it could be reasonable for an atheist to commit herself to a form of life shaped by a theistic community's language and ritual practice because she recognizes how participating in such a community: (1) allows her to express commitment to a distinctively religious ideal (the expressivist component), and (2) powerfully helps foster personal and communal progress toward that ideal (the instrumentalist component). The view is fictionalist insofar as the atheist in question believes that since the language in the relevant religious narratives and doctrines fails to refer successfully to an existing transcendent personal being, as intended by the traditional theistic ‘believer,’ the language should be reinterpreted instead as a part of a powerfully expressive and useful fiction …  If the fictionalist view required the invention of completely new and unfamiliar uses for theistic language, these objections would have considerable force. Fortunately, they do not. The first mistaken assumption that seems to underlie these objections is that theistic language prior to reform by the fictionalist has but one function, namely to assert theological truths. [5]

Is Wittgenstein Realist?

The documents I have examined do not provide a direct quotation or explicit evidence that he is leaning toward being a realist. However, Wittgenstein’s approach is depicted as complex and not easy to classify within the traditional realism and non-realism dichotomy.          

“The Earlier Wittgenstein on the Notion of Religious Attitude” by Chon Tejedor suggests that interpreting Wittgenstein as a religious non-realist due to his alleged linguistic idealism or behaviorism might misrepresent or be inconsistent with his philosophy. However, it does not explicitly argue that Wittgenstein is a realist; instead, it challenges the classification of his views as non-realist, especially in religious contexts.                                  

In “Wittgenstein and Realism,” Michael Scott discusses Wittgenstein’s approach to the philosophical debate on realism, particularly in the context of religious discourse. Based on the following texts, we can interpret that Wittgenstein leans towards a form of realism.

Wittgenstein thought there are many differences in the standards and forms of justification informing religious and scientific discourses. However, the evidence of such differences can be used to support two quite different and conflicting lines of argument. On one apparently realist argument, the differences are taken to show that religious discourse describes different kinds of fact (or offers different kinds of description) to scientific discourse. [6]

Scott further elaborates on Wittgenstein's perspective regarding the function of religious language, suggesting that Wittgenstein did not see religious discourse as lacking a descriptive function but as operating with a different kind of truth standard:

Philosophers of religion influenced by Wittgenstein have tended to follow the second line of resistance to verificationism, i.e., giving such prominence to the notion of empirical verification was a mistake. Where the verificationist goes wrong, on this view, is not in the attention to verification conditions per se but in insisting that in any field of discourse a particular type of verification - empirical verification – is the only one suitable. [7]

This situation indicates that Wittgenstein perhaps recognized the unique standards and justifications within religious discourse, differentiating them from those in scientific discourse without necessarily undermining religious statements’ truth or descriptive nature. Such a perspective aligns with a nuanced form of realism, acknowledging that religious language can describe reality, albeit in a manner distinct from the empirical sciences.              

In essence, while Wittgenstein highlighted the differences in justificatory standards between religious and scientific discourses, his approach can be interpreted as supporting a form of realism that respects the unique nature of religious truth and description. This interpretation suggests that Wittgenstein viewed religious language as capable of describing reality and conveying truth, although within a framework that diverges from empirical science.

Conclusion

Through examination of various arguments, I can state that Wittgenstein’s philosophy lends itself to non-realist interpretations due to its emphasis on language and rejection of the idea that meaning is derived from direct correspondence with independent realism. This is apparent in his acknowledgement of the distinct standards of truth and justification within religious discourse, suggesting religious language. In contrast, different from scientific language, it can nonetheless convey the truth about reality.                                                                         

Linguistics is the analysis of the language system that specifically focuses on grammar, semantics, and its structure, whereas philosophy of language portrays the way language produces meanings. I believe that the philosophy of language can establish bridges between language, belief, truth, and value. I deem language not just a tool for performing vocative functions; it shapes our humanity, facilitates our most profound connections, and serves as the foundation for moral and spiritual guidance.    

Science only examines language as an empirical object, reducing reality to a physical phenomenon that can be quantitatively measured and explained. [8] However, Muhammad Fethullah Gulen (d. 2024), a famous Turkish thinker, said,

It [i.e. language] gives voice to our thoughts; it is the rhythm of our feelings and the excitement of our hearts; it is the interpreter in our communication with God Almighty. Language reflects the Divine Archetype and is the repository of divine knowledge. By the faculty of language, humankind has been elevated to the rank of vicegerent on this earth. [9]

We cannot reduce language to empty signs and images when it has a divine origin. There is a sacredness to language, and it can express the Divine. Language can establish a relationship between a Creator and the created. Ideas and values underpin words. Language can teach moral values. There is a relationship between language, belief, meaning, and understanding. [10] Language can preserve core values and intellectual reserves with genealogical and teleological functions. It is a link to our origins and heritage. It is an essential tool to understand the Truth both holistically and analytically.

Bibliography

1. Collins, James D. “Wittgenstein and Anti-Realism.” Auslegung: A Journal of Philosophy 9, no. 2 (1982): 173–81. https://doi.org/10.17161/AJP.1808.9031.
2. Eshleman, Andrew. “Religious Fictionalism Defended: Reply to Cordry.” Religious Studies 46, no. 1 (2010): 91–96. http://www.jstor.org/stable/25676924.
3. Gülen, Fethullah. Speech and Power of Expression, 2012.
4. Khan, Aalia Sohail. Language, Meaning, and Purpose, 2014.
5. Medina, Jose. Language: Key Concepts in Philosophy. London: Continuum, 2005.
6. Scott, Michael. “Wittgenstein and Realism.” Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers 17, no. 2 (2000). https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol17/iss2/2. https://doi.org/10.5840/faithphil20001727.
7. Tejedor, Chon. “The Earlier Wittgenstein on the Notion of Religious Attitude.” Philosophy 88, no. 343 (2013): 55–79. http://www.jstor.org/stable/24778695.
8. Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Philosophical Investigations. Oxford: Blackwell, 1992.
9. Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1992.

References

1. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical investigations (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992).
2. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus logico-philosophicus (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & CO., LTD, 1992).
3. Chon Tejedor, “The Earlier Wittgenstein on the Notion of Religious Attitude,” Philosophy 88, no. 343 (2013): 55–79, http://www.jstor.org/stable/24778695.
4. James D. Collins, “Wittgenstein and Anti-Realism,” Auslegung: A Journal of Philosophy 9 (1982): 173–81, https://doi.org/10.17161/AJP.1808.9031.
5. Andrew Eshleman, “Religious Fictionalism Defended: Reply to Cordry,” Religious Studies 46 (2010): 91–96, http://www.jstor.org/stable/25676924.
6. Michael Scott, "Wittgenstein and Realism," Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers 17 (2000), https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol17/iss2/2
7. Scott, "Wittgenstein and Realism."
8. Jose Medina, Language: Key Concepts in Philosophy (Continuum, 2005), 40.
9. Fethullah Gülen, Speech and Power of Expression (2012).
10. Aalia Sohail Khan, Language, Meaning, and Purpose (2014).